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Privacy preservation in continuous-time average consensus algorithm
via deterministic additive perturbation signals
Navid Rezazadeh and Solmaz S. Kia
Abstract—This paper considers the problem of privacy preser-
vation against passive internal and external malicious agents
in the continuous-time Laplacian average consensus algorithm
over strongly connected and weight-balanced digraphs. For this
problem, we evaluate the effectiveness of use of additive perturba-
tion signals as a privacy preservation measure against malicious
agents that know the graph topology. Our results include (a)
identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions on admissible
additive perturbation signals that do not perturb the convergence
point of the algorithm from the average of initial values of the
agents; (b) obtaining the necessary and sufficient condition on
the knowledge set of a malicious agent that enables it to identify
the initial value of another agent; (c) designing observers that
internal and external malicious agents can use to identify the
initial conditions of another agent when their knowledge set on
that agent enables them to do so. We demonstrate our results
through a numerical example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized multi-agent cooperative operations have been
emerging as effective solutions for some of today’s important
socio-economical challenges. However, in some areas involv-
ing sensitive data, for example in smart grid, banking or health-
care applications, adaption of these solutions are hindered by
concerns regarding the privacy preservation guarantees of the
participating clients. Motivated by the demand for privacy
preservation evaluations and design of privacy preserving aug-
mentations for existing decentralized solutions, in this paper
we consider the privacy preservation problem in the distributed
static average consensus problem using additive perturba-
tion signals.
Static average consensus problem in a network of agents
each endowed with a local static reference value consists of
designing a distributed algorithm that enables each agent to
asymptotically obtain the average of the static reference values
across the network. The solutions to this problem has been
used in various distributed computing, synchronization and
estimation problems as well as control of multi-agent cyber
physical systems. Average consensus problem has been studied
extensively in the literature (see e.g., [1]–[3], [4]). The widely
adopted distributed solution for the static average consensus
problem is the simple first order Laplacian algorithm in which
each agent initializes its local dynamics with its local reference
value and transmits this local value to its neighboring agents.
Therefore, the reference value is readily revealed to outside
world, and thus the privacy of the agents implementing this
algorithm is trivially breached. This paper studies the multi-
agent static average consensus problem under the privacy
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preservation requirement against internal and external passive
malicious agents in the network. By passive, we mean agents
that only listen to the communication messages and want to
obtain the reference value of the other agents without interrupt-
ing the distributed operation. The solution we examine is to
induce privacy preservation property by adding perturbation
signals to the internal dynamics and the transmitted output
of the agents.
Literature review: Privacy preservation solutions for the aver-
age consensus problem have been investigated in the literature
mainly in the context of discrete-time consensus algorithms
over connected undirected graphs. The general idea is to add
perturbation signals to the transmitted out signal of the agents.
For example, in one of the early privacy preserving schemes,
Kefayati, Talebi and Khalaj [5] proposed that each agent adds
a random number generated by zero-mean Gaussian processes
to its initial condition. This way the reference value of the
agents is guaranteed to stay private but the algorithm does
not necessarily converge to the anticipated value. Similarly, in
recent years, Nozari, Tallapragada and Cortes [6] also relied on
adding zero mean noises to protect the privacy of the agents.
However, they develop their noises according to a framework
defined based on the concept of differential privacy, which is
initially developed in the data science literature [7]–[10]. In
this framework, [6] characterizes the convergence degradation
and proposes an optimal noise in order to keep a level of
privacy to the agents while minimizing the rate of convergence
deterioration. To eliminate deviation from desired convergence
point, Manitara and Hadjicostis [11] proposed to add a zero
sum finite sequence of noises to the transmitted signal of
each agent, and Mo and Murray [12] proposed to add a zero
sum infinite sequences. Because of the zero sum condition on
the perturbation signals, however [11] and [12] show that the
privacy of an agent can only be preserved when the malicious
agent does not have access to at least one of the signals
transmitted to that agent. Additive noises have also been used
as a privacy preservation mechanism in other distributed al-
gorithms such as distributed optimization [13] and distributed
estimation [14], [15]. A thorough review of these results can
be found in a recent tutorial paper [16]. For the discrete-
time average consensus, on a different approach, [17] uses a
cryptographic approach to preserve the privacy of the agents.
Statement of contributions: We consider the problem of pri-
vacy preservation of the continuous-time static Laplacian
average consensus algorithm over strongly connected and
weight-balanced digraphs using additive perturbation signals.
The previous work reviewed above considers discrete-time
algorithms over connected undirected graphs. Similar to the
reviewed literature, in our privacy preservation analysis, we
consider the extreme case that the malicious agents know the
graph topology. But, instead of random noises, we use the set
of continuous-time integrable additive perturbation signals. In
addition to the commonly used additive perturbation signal to
the transmitted out signal of the agents, we also add another
perturbation signal to the agreement dynamics of the agents as
another source of obfuscation in the algorithm. Also, instead
of using the customary zero-sum vanishing additive signals,
we carefully examine the stability and convergence proprieties
of the static average consensus algorithm in the presence of
the perturbation signals to find the necessary and sufficient
conditions on the perturbation signals such that the integrity of
the algorithm is preserved, i.e., despite the perturbation signals
the agents still converge to the average of their reference
values. We refer to such signals as admissible perturbation
signals. An interesting finding, which has not been observed
in the literature, is that the perturbation signals do not have
to be vanishing. Understanding the nature of the admissible
perturbation signals is crucial in the privacy preservation
evaluations, as it is rational to assume that the malicious agents
are aware of the necessary conditions on such signals.
The necessary and sufficient conditions that specify the ad-
missible perturbation signals of the agents are highly coupled.
We discuss how the agents can choose their admissible per-
turbation signals locally with or without coordination among
themselves. The conditions we obtain to define the locally
chosen admissible perturbation signals are coupled through
a set of under-determined linear algebraic constraints with
constant scalar free variables. Then, we evaluate the privacy
preservation of the Laplacian average consensus algorithm
with additive locally chosen admissible perturbation signals
against internal and external malicious agents, depending on
whether the coupling variables of the necessary conditions
defining the locally chosen admissible perturbation signals are
known to the malicious agent or not. We show that when
the coupling variables are known to the malicious agents,
they can use this extra piece of information to enhance their
knowledge set to discover the private value of the other agents.
In this case, Our main result then states that the necessary
and sufficient condition for a malicious agent to be able to
identify the initial value of another agent is to have direct
access to all the signals transmitted to and out of the agent.
Our next contribution is to design asymptotic observers that
internal and external malicious agents can use to identify the
initial condition of another agent when their knowledge set
on that agent enables them to do so. We characterize also
the estimation error of these observers at each time. Our
results show that external malicious agents need to use an
observer with a higher numerical complexity to compensate for
the local state information that internal malicious agents can
use. As another contribution, we identify examples of graphs
topologies in which the privacy of all the agents are preserved
using additive admissible perturbation signals. On the other
hand, if the coupling variables of the necessary conditions
defining the locally chosen admissible perturbation signals are
unknown to the malicious agents, we show that the malicious
agents cannot reconstruct the private reference value of the
other agents even if they have full access to all the transmitted
input and output signals of an agent. We use input-to-state
stability (ISS) results (see [18], [19]) to perform our analysis.
We demonstrate our results through a numerical example with
non-vanishing perturbation signals. A preliminary version of
our work has appeared in [20]. In this paper the results are
extended in the following directions: (a) we derive the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions to characterize the admissible
signals; (b) we study privacy preservation also with respect
to external malicious agents; (c) we consider a general class
of set of measurable essentially bounded perturbation signals;
(d) we improve our main result from sufficient condition to
necessary and sufficient condition.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We denote the standard Euclidean norm of vector x ∈ Rn
by ‖x‖ =
√
x⊤x, and the (essential) supremum norm of a
signal f : R≥0 → Rn by ‖f‖ess = (ess) sup{‖f(t)‖, t ≥
0}. The set of measurable essentially bounded functions f :
R≥0 → Rn is denoted by L∞n . The set of measurable functions
f : R≥0 → Rn that satisfy
∫ t
0
‖f(τ)‖dτ < ∞ is denoted by
L1n. For a sets A and B, the relative complement of B in
A is A\B = {x ∈ A |x 6∈ B}. For a vector x ∈ Rn, the
sum of its elements is sum(x). In a network of N agents, to
emphasize that a variable is local to an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
we use superscripts. Moreover, if pi ∈ R is a variable of
agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the aggregated pi’s of the network is
the vector p = [{pi}Ni=1] = [p1, · · · , pN ]⊤ ∈ RN .
Graph theory: in the following, we review some basic con-
cepts from algebraic graph theory following [21]. A weighted
directed graph (digraph) is a triplet G = (V , E ,A), where
V = {1, . . . , N} is the node set, E ⊆ V × V is the edge
set and A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N is a weighted adjacency matrix
with the property that aij > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E and aij = 0,
otherwise. A weighted digraph is undirected if aij = aji
for all i, j ∈ V . An edge from i to j, denoted by (i, j),
means that agent j can send information to agent i. For an
edge (i, j) ∈ E , i is called an in-neighbor of j and j is
called an out-neighbor of i. We denote the set of the out-
neighbors of an agent i ∈ V by N iout. We define N iout+i =
N iout ∪ {i}. A directed path is a sequence of nodes connected
by edges. A digraph is called strongly connected if for every
pair of vertices there is a directed path connecting them.
We refer to a strongly connected and undirected graph as
a connected graph. The weighted out-degree and weighted
in-degree of a node i, are respectively, diin =
∑N
j=1 aji
and diout =
∑N
j=1 aij . A digraph is weight-balanced if at
each node i ∈ V , the weighted out-degree and weighted
in-degree coincide (although they might be different across
different nodes). The (out-) Laplacian matrix is L = [ℓij ] is
L = Dout − A, where Dout = Diag(d1out, · · · , dNout) ∈ RN×N .
Note that L1N = 0. A digraph is weight-balanced if and only
if 1⊤NL = 0. For a strongly connected and weight-balanced
digraph, rank(L) = N−1, rank(L+L⊤) = N −1, and L has
one zero eigenvalue λ1 = 0 and the rest of its eigenvalues have
positive real parts. We let R ∈ RN×(N−1) be a matrix whose
columns are normalized orthogonal complement of 1N . Then
T⊤LT=
[
0 0
0 L+
]
, T=
[
1√
N
1N R
]
, L+=R⊤LR. (1)
{yj(t)}j∈N iout −∑Nj=1 aij (xi(t)− yj(t)) +
f i(t)
∫
+
gi(t)
yi(t)
xi(t)
Fig. 1: Graphical representation of algorithm 3.
For a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph, −L+
is a Hurwitz matrix.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the static average consensus algorithm
x˙i(t) = −
∑N
j=1
aij (x
i(t)− xj(t)), xi(0) = ri, (2)
over a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph
G(V , E ,A). For such an interaction typology, xi of each agent
i ∈ V converges to 1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j as t → ∞ [4]. In this algo-
rithm, ri, represents a reference value of agent i ∈ V . Because
in (2), the reference value ri of each agent i ∈ V is transmitted
to its in-neighbors, this algorithm trivially reveals the reference
value ri of each agent i ∈ V to all its in-neighbors and any
external agent that is listening to the communication messages.
In this paper, we investigate whether in a network of N ≥ 3
agents, the reference value of the agents can be concealed
from the malicious agents by adding the perturbation signals
f i ∈ L∞1 and gi ∈ L∞1 to, respectively, the internal dynamics
and the transmitted signal of each agent i ∈ V (see Fig. 1),
i.e.,
x˙i(t) = −
∑N
j=1
aij (x
i(t)− yj(t)) + f i(t), (3a)
yi(t) = xi(t) + gi(t), (3b)
xi(0) = ri, (3c)
while still guaranteeing that xi converges to 1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j as
t→∞. We define the malicious agents formally as follows.
Definition 1 (malicious agent): A malicious agent is an agent
inside (internal agent) or outside (external agent) the network
that stores and processes the transmitted inter-agent commu-
nication messages that it can access so that it can obtain the
private reference value of the other agents in the network,
without interfering with the execution of algorithm (3). That
is, the malicious agents are passive attackers. 
We refer to the set of perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1
for which each agent i ∈ V still converges to the exact
average of the reference values across the network, i.e.,
limt→∞ xi(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 x
j(0) = 1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j , as the admis-
sible perturbation signals.
Theorem 3.1 (The set of necessary and sufficient conditions
on the admissible perturbation signals): Consider algorithm (3)
over a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph with
perturbation signals f i, gi ∈ L∞1 , i ∈ V . Then, the trajectory
t 7→ xi(t), of all agents i ∈ V converges to 1
N
∑N
j=1 x
j(0) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j as t→∞ if and only if
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
∑N
k=1
(fk(τ)+dkout g
k(τ)) dτ = 0, (4a)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤(f (τ) + Ag(τ)) dτ = 0, (4b)
where L+ and R are defined in (1). 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in the appendix. The
necessary and sufficient conditions in (4) that specify the
admissible signals of the agents are highly coupled. The
following result gives a representation that the coupling is in
the form of a set of linear algebraic constraints.
Theorem 3.2 (Locally chosen admissible signals): Consider
algorithm (3) over a strongly connected and weight-balanced
digraph. Let each agent i ∈ V choose its local perturbation
signals f i, gi ∈ L∞1 such that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(f i(τ)+diout g
i(τ)) dτ = βi, (5)
where βi ∈ R. Then, the necessary and sufficient conditions
to satisfy (4) are∑N
k=1
βk = 0, (6a)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)gi(τ)dτ = α ∈ R, i ∈ V . (6b)

The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in the appendix. We refer
to the admissible signals chosen according to (5) and (6) as the
locally chosen admissible signals. For a given set of {βi}Ni=1
and α, Theorem 3.2 enables the agents to choose their admis-
sible perturbation signals locally with guaranteed convergence
to the exact average consensus. Choosing signals that satisfy
condition (5) is rather easy. However, condition (6b) appears to
be more complex. The result below, whose proof is given in the
appendix, identifies three classes of signals that are guaranteed
to satisfy condition (6b).
Lemma 3.1 (Signals that satisfy (6b) ): For a given α ∈
R, let g = g1 + g2 ∈ L∞1 satisfy one of the condi-
tions (a) limt→∞ g(t) = α (b) limt→∞ g1(t) = α and
limt→∞
∫ t
0 g2(τ)dτ = g¯ < ∞ (c) limt→∞ g1(t) = α and∫ t
0 σ(|g2(τ)|)dτ < ∞ for t ∈ R≥0, where σ is any class
K∞ function. Then, limt→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g(τ)dτ = α. 
An interesting fact that Lemma 3.1 reveals is that the ad-
missible perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1, unlike the existing
results for the discrete-time average consensus algorithm, e.g.,
in [12], do not necessarily need to be vanishing signals even
for α = 0 and βi = 0, i ∈ V . For example, in the
numerical example in Section V where α = 0 and βi = 0,
i ∈ V , we use gi(t) = sin(i t2), i ∈ V , which is a non-
vanishing signal that satisfies condition (b) of Lemma 3.1
(limt→∞
∫ t
0 sin(iτ
2)=
√
π
8i ).
We examine the privacy preservation properties of algo-
rithm (3) against non-collaborative malicious agents. The
malicious agents are non-collaborative if they do not share
their knowledge sets with each other. The knowledge set of a
malicious agent is the information that it can use to infer the
private reference value of the other agents. The extension of
our results to collaborative agents is rather straightforward and
is omitted for brevity. Without loss of generality, we assume
that agent 1 is the malicious internal agent that wants to obtain
reference value of other agents in the network. At each time
t ∈ R≥0, the signals that are available to agent 1 are
Y1(t) = {x1(τ), y1(τ), {yi(τ)}i∈N 1out}tτ=0.
For an external malicious agent, the available signals depend
on what channels it intercepts. We assume that the external
malicious agent can associate the intercepted signals to the
corresponding agents. We represent the set of these signals
with Yext(t). We assume that the malicious agent knows the
graph topology. It is also rational to assume that the malicious
agents are aware of the form of the necessary conditions on
the admissible perturbation signals.
Remark 3.1 (Locally chosen admissible signals): If there
exists an ultimately secure and trusted authority that over-
sees the operation, this authority can assign to each agent
its admissible private perturbation signals that collectively
satisfy (4). However, in what follows, we consider a scenario
where such an authority does not exist, and each agent
i ∈ V , to increase its privacy protection level, wants to
choose its own admissible signals (f i, gi) privately without
revealing them explicitly to the other agents. In this setting,
the agents do not know if others are using perturbation signals
or not. The only information available to the agents is that
their collective choices should satisfy (4). Then, in light of
Theorem 3.2, to ensure (4a) each agent i∈V chooses its local
admissible perturbation signals according to (5) with βi =0.
Consequently, according to Theorem 3.2 again, each agent
i ∈ V needs to choose its respective gi according to (6b)
with α = 0. Any other choice of {βi}Ni=1 and α needs an
inter-agent coordination/agreement procedure. In case of the
locally chosen admissible perturbation signals without inter-
agent coordination, since the agents need to satisfy (5) and (6)
with α = βi = 0, i ∈ V , these values will be known to the
malicious agents. In case that the agents coordinate to choose
non-zero values for α and {β}Ni=1 such that (5) and (6) are
satisfied, it is likely that these choices to be known to the
malicious agents. In our privacy preservation analysis below,
we consider both cases when the choices of α and {β}Ni=1 are
either known or unknown to the malicious agents. 
Definition 2 (Knowledge set of a malicious agent): The
knowledge set of the malicious internal agent 1 and external
agent ext is assumed to be one of the cases below,
• Case 1:
Ka= {Ya(∞),G(V , E ,A),
form of conditions (5) and (6), α, {βi}Ni=1
}
, (7)
• Case 2:
K1= {Y1(∞),G(V , E ,A),
form of conditions (5) and (6), α}, (8)
Kext= {Yext(∞),G(V , E ,A),
form of conditions (5) and (6)}, (9)
where a ∈ {1, ext}. 
Our objective in this paper is to determine the effectiveness
of use of additive perturbation signals, as introduced in (3),
as a privacy preserving measure for the Laplacian average
consensus algorithm against internal or external malicious
agents with a knowledge set belonging to one of the cases
in Definition 2. Our study intends to determine: (a) whether
the malicious agents inside or outside the network can ob-
tain the reference value of the other agents by storing and
processing the transmitted messages; (b) more specifically,
what knowledge set enables an agent inside or outside the
network to discover the reference value of the other agents in
the network; (c) what observers such agents can employ to
obtain the reference value of the other agents in the network.
IV. PRIVACY PRESERVATION EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the privacy preservation proper-
ties of the modified average consensus algorithm (3) against
malicious internal agent 1 and a malicious external agent
whose knowledge sets are either of the two cases given
in Definition 2. From the perspective of a malicious agent
interested in private reference value of another agent i ∈ V ,
the dynamical system to observe is (3) with xi as the internal
state, (f i, gi, {yj}j∈N iout ) as the inputs and yi as the measured
output. When inputs and measured outputs over some finite
time interval (resp. infinite time) are known, the traditional
observability (resp. detectability) tests (see [22], [23]) can
determine whether the initial conditions of the system can be
identified. However, here the inputs f i and gi : R≥0 → R
of agent i ∈ V are not available to the malicious agent.
All is known is the conditions (5) and (6) that specify the
perturbation signals. With regard to inputs {yj}j∈N iout and
output yi, an external agent should intercept these signals
while the internal malicious agent 1 has only access to these
inputs if it is an in-neighbor of agent i and all the out-
neighbors of agent i (e.g., in Fig. 2, agent 1 is an in-neighbor
of agent 2 and all the out-neighbors of agent 2).
A. Case 1 knowledge set
The following results show that in a scenario that the malicious
agent with the knowledge set (7) has access to all the transmit-
ted input and output signals of another agent i, it can identify
the reference value of agent i despite the perturbation signals.
Theorem 4.1 (Observer design for an internal malicious
agent with the knowledge set (7)): Consider the modified
static average consensus algorithm (3) with a set of locally
chosen admissible perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1 over a
strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph G. Let agent
1 be the in-neighbor of agent i ∈ V and all the out-neighbors
of agent i, i.e., agent 1 knows {yj(t)}j∈N i
out+i
, t ∈ R≥0. Let
the knowledge set of agent 1 be (7). Then, agent 1 can employ
the observer
ζ˙ =
∑N
j=1
aij(y
i − yj), ζ(0) = −βi, (10a)
ν(t) = ζ(t) + x1(t), (10b)
to asymptotically obtain ri, i.e., ν → ri as t → ∞. More-
over, at any time t ∈ R≥0, the estimation error of the observer
satisfies
ν(t)− ri = x1(t)−xi(t) +
∫ t
0
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ − βi.
(11)
Proof 1: Given (3) and (10) we can write
ζ˙ + x˙i = f i + diout g
i
which, because of xi(0) = ri and ζ(0) = −βi, gives
ζ(t) = −xi(t) + ri +
∫ t
0
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ − βi, t ∈ R≥0.
Then, using (10b) and (3b) we obtain (11) as the estimation
error. Subsequently, because of (5) and since limt→∞(x1(t)−
xi(t)) = 0, from (11) we obtain limt→∞ ν(t) = ri.
To construct the observer (10), the internal malicious agent
used its own local state. The following result shows that
an external malicious agent can compensate for the lack of
this internal state information by employing a higher order
observer and also invoking condition (6b), which the internal
malicious agent does not need. This means that an external
malicious agent incurs a higher computational cost.
Theorem 4.2 (Observer design for an external malicious
agent with the knowledge set (7)): Consider the modified static
average consensus algorithm (3) with a set of locally chosen
admissible perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1 over a strongly
connected and weight-balanced digraph G. Consider an ex-
ternal malicious agent that has access to the output signals
of agent i ∈ V and all its out-neighbors, i.e., {yj(t)}j∈N i
out+i
,
t ∈ R≥0. Let the knowledge set of this agent be (7). Then, this
external malicious agent can employ the observer
ζ˙ =
∑N
j=1
aij(y
i − yj), ζ(0) = −βi − α, (12a)
η˙ = −η + yi, η(0) ∈ R, (12b)
ν(t) = ζ(t) + η(t), (12c)
to asymptotically obtain ri, i ∈ V , i.e., ν → ri as t → ∞.
Moreover, at any time t ∈ R≥0, the estimation error of the
observer satisfies
ν(t)−ri= η(t)−xi(t) +
∫ t
0
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ − βi − α,
(13)
where
η(t) = e−tη0+
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)xi(τ)dτ+
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)gi(τ)dτ. (14)
1
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Proof 2: Given (3) and (12a), we can write
ζ˙ + x˙i = f i + diout g
i,
which given xi(0)= ri and ζ(0)=−βi−α, for t ∈ R≥0 gives
ζ(t)=−xi(t) + ri+
∫ t
0
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ − βi − α.
(15)
On the other hand, using (3b), t 7→ η(t) is obtained from (14).
Then, tracking error (13) is readily deduced from (12c)
and (15). Next, given (5) and (6b) and also limt→∞ e−tη0 =
0, we obtain limt→∞ ν(t) = ri + limt→∞(−xi(t) +∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)xi(τ)dτ). Subsequently, since limt→∞ xi(t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j , we can conclude our proof by invoking
Lemma 7.2 that guarantees limt→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)xi(τ)dτ =
limt→∞ xi(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 r
j .
When a malicious agent does not have direct access to all
the signals in {yj(t)}j∈N i
out+i
, a rational strategy appears to
be that the malicious agent estimates the signals it does not
have access to. If those agents also have out-neighbors that
their output signals are not available to the malicious agent,
then the malicious agent should estimate the state of those
agents as well, until the only inputs to the dynamics that it
observes are the additive admissible perturbation signals. For
example, in Fig. 2, to obtain the reference value of agent 6,
agent 1 compensates for the lack of direct access to y7(t),
which enter the dynamics of agent 6, by estimating the state
of all the agents in subgraph G13 . Our results below however
show that this strategy is not effective. In fact, we show that
a malicious agent (internal or external) is able to uniquely
identify the reference value of an agent i ∈ V if and only if
it has direct access to {yj(t)}j∈N i
out+i
for all t ∈ R≥0.
To present our results, we first introduce some notations. Let
V¯1k , k ∈ {1, . . . , n¯1} be the set of the agents in the kth induced
disjoint subgraph obtained from removal of agent 1 and its
incident edges.
Recall that if 1 is an articulation point1 of the undirected
representation of digraph G, then n¯1 > 1, otherwise n¯1 = 1.
1An articulation point of an undirected connected graph is a node whose
removal along with its incident edges disconnects the graph [24].
1V1k,2
V1k,3
V1k,4
V\V1k
rest of network
Fig. 3: The kth induced island of malicious agent 1. The super node
V
1
k,2 in G
1
k is the set of the out-neighbors of agent 1 that each of them
has at least one out-neighbor that is not an out-neighbor of agent 1.
The super node V
1
k,4 is the set of the out-neighbors of agent 1 whose
out-neighbors are all also out-neighbors of agent 1. Finally, the super
node V
1
k,3 is the set of the agents in G
1
k that are not an out-neighbor
of agent 1. An arrow from each node a (agent 1 or each super node)
to another node b (agent 1 or each super node) indicates that at least
one agent in a can obtain information from at least one agent in b.
The thin connection lines may or may not exist in a network.
We refer to every induced subgraph G1k = (V1k , E1k ) ⊂ G(V , E),
k ∈ {1, . . . , n¯1}, where V1k = V¯1k ∪ {1} and E1k = {(l, j) ∈
E| l ∈ V1k , j ∈ V1k}, as the kth island of agent 1. Note
that every island of agent 1 is connected to the rest of the
digraph G only through agent 1 (see Fig. 2 for an example).
Let G11 = (V11 , E11 ) be the island of agent 1 that includes agent
2, the out-neighbor of agent 1 that agent 1 wants to obtain its
reference value r2. Because every agent in G11 is connected to
the rest of the agents in digraph G only through agent 1, all
the out-neighbors and in-neighbors of agent 2 are necessarily
in G11 . Based on how each agent interacts with agent 1, we
divide the agents of island G11 into three groups as described
below (see Fig. 3)
• V11,2 =
{
i ∈ V11
∣∣ i ∈ N 1out, N iout 6⊂ N 1out+1},
• V11,3 =
{
i ∈ V11
∣∣ i /∈ N 1out}.
• V11,4 =
{
i ∈ V11
∣∣ i ∈ N 1out, N iout ⊆ N 1out+1},
Without loss of generality, in what follows we assume that the
agents in the network are labeled according to the ordered set
(1,V11,2,V11,3,V11,4,V\V11 ). We let the aggregated states and
perturbation signals of the agents in V11,l, l ∈ {2, 3, 4}, be
xl = [x
i]
i∈V1
1,l
, gl = [g
i]
i∈V1
1,l
and f l = [f
i]
i∈V1
1,l
. Similarly,
we let the aggregated states and perturbation signals of the
agents in V\V11 be x5 = [xi]i∈V\V1
1
, g5 = [g
i]
i∈V\V1
1
and
f5 = [f
i]
i∈V\V1
1
. We partition L, A and Dout, respectively,
to subblock matrices Lij ’s, Aij ’s and D
out
ij ’s in a comparable
manner to the partitioned aggregated state (x1,x2,x3,x4,x5)
(see (44)). By definition Lij = −Aij , i, j ∈ {1, · · · , 5}, i 6= j.
Lemma 4.1 (A case of indistinguishable admissible initial
conditions for an internal malicious agent): Consider the
modified static average consensus algorithm (3) with a set
of locally chosen admissible perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1
over a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph G.
Let t 7→ yi(t) be the transmitted signal from agent i ∈ V
for t ∈ R≥0. Let G11 = (V11 , E11 ) be an island of agent
1 that satisfies V11,2 6= {}. Now consider an alternative
implementation of algorithm (3a)-(3b) with initial condition
xi
′
(0) = xi(0) = ri, i ∈ V\(V11,2 ∪ V11,3),
xi
′
(0) ∈ R, i ∈ (V11,2 ∪ V11,3), s.t. (16)
x′2(0)− x2(0) = −A23L−133 (x′3(0)− x3(0)),
and perturbation signals
gi
′
(t) = gi(t), f i
′
(t) = f i(t), i ∈ V\V11,2,
gi
′
(t) = gi(t) + e−d
i
outt(xi
′
(0)− xi(0)), i ∈ V11,2,
(17)
f i
′
(t) = f i(t)−
[
A23e
−L33t(x′3(0)−x3(0))
]
i−1
, i ∈ V11,2.
Let t 7→ xi′(t) and t 7→ yi′(t), t ∈ R≥0, respectively, be the
state and the transmitted signal of agent i ∈ V in this case.
Then, ∑N
j=1
xj
′
(0) =
∑N
j=1
xj(0) =
∑N
j=1
r
j , (18)
lim
t→∞x
i′(t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1
r
j , i ∈ V . (19)
Moreover,
yj(t) = yj
′
(t), t ∈ R≥0, j ∈ V\V11,3. (20)

The proof of Lemma 4.1 is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.1 states that there exists infinite number of admis-
sible initial conditions and admissible perturbation signals for
an agent i ∈ N 1out and any agent j ∈ N iout\N 1out+1 6= {} that
agent 1 cannot distinguish between, because for all of these
cases, the signals transmitted from any out-neighbor of agent
1 are identical. We can develop similar results, as stated in
the corollary below, for an external malicious agent that does
not have direct access to the output signal of some of the
out-neighbors of agent i ∈ V . The proof of this corollary is
omitted for brevity.
Corollary 4.1 (A case of indistinguishable admissible initial
conditions for an external malicious agent): Consider the
modified static average consensus algorithm (3) with a set
of locally chosen admissible perturbation signals {f j, gj}Nj=1
over a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph G.
Let t 7→ yi(t) be the transmitted signal from agent i ∈ V
for t ∈ R≥0. Consider an external malicious agent that has
direct access to the output signal of agent 2 ∈ V but not
that of the agent 3 ∈ N 2out. Now consider an alternative
implementation of algorithm (3a)-(3b) with initial condition
xi′(0) = xi(0) = ri for i ∈ V\{2, 3}, and x2′(0), x3′(0) ∈ R
such that x2′(0) − x2(0) = − a23
ℓ33
(x3′(0) − x3(0)), and
perturbation signals gi′(t) = gi(t), f i′(t) = f i(t), for
i ∈ V{2}, and g2′(t) = g2(t) + e−d2outt(x2′(0) − x2(0)) and
f2′(t) = f2(t) − a23e−ℓ33t(x3′(0) − x3(0)). Let t 7→ xi′(t)
and t 7→ yi′(t), t ∈ R≥0, respectively, be the state and the
transmitted signal of agent i ∈ V in this case. Then, the
equations (18) and (19) hold. Moreover,
yj(t) = yj
′
(t), t ∈ R≥0, j ∈ V\{3}.
Building on our results so far, we are now ready to state the
necessary and sufficient condition under which a malicious
agent with knowledge set (7) can discover the reference value
of an agent i ∈ V .
Theorem 4.3 (Privacy preservation using the modified aver-
age consensus algorithm (3) when the knowledge set of the
malicious agents is given by Case 1 in Definition 2): Consider
the modified static average consensus algorithm (3) with a set
of locally chosen admissible perturbation signals {f i, gi}Ni=1
over a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph G.
Let the knowledge set of the internal malicious agent 1 and
external agent ext be (7). Then, (a) agent 1 can reconstruct
the exact initial value of agent i ∈ V\{1} if and only if
i ∈ N 1out and N iout ⊆ N 1out+1; (b) the external agent ext can
reconstruct the exact initial value of agent i ∈ V if and only
if {{yj(τ)}j∈N i
out+i
}∞τ=0 ⊆ Yext(∞).
Proof 3: Proof of statement (a): If i ∈ N 1out and N iout ⊆
N 1out+1, Theorem (4.1) guarantees that agent 1 can employ an
observer to obtain the reference value of agent i. Next, we
show that if i 6∈ N 1out or N iout 6⊂ N 1out+1, then agent 1 cannot
uniquely identify the reference value ri of agent i. Suppose
agent i ∈ V\{1} satisfies i 6∈ N 1out (resp. i ∈ N 1out and N iout 6⊂
N 1out+1). Without loss of generality let V11 be the island of
agent 1 that contains this agent i. Consequently, i ∈ V11,3
(resp. i ∈ V11,2). Then, by virtue of Lemma 4.1, we know that
there exists infinite number of alternative admissible initial
conditions and corresponding admissible perturbation signals
for any agents in V11,3∪V11,2 for which the time histories of each
signal transmitted to agent 1 are identical. Therefore, agent 1
cannot uniquely identify the initial condition of any agents in
V11,3 ∪ V11,2. In light of Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.1, the
proof of statement (b) is similar to that of statement (a) and
is omitted for brevity.
Remark 4.1 (Examples of privacy preserving graph topolo-
gies): Cyclic bipartite undirected graphs, 4-regular ring lattice
undirected graphs with N > 5, planar stacked prism graphs,
directed ring graphs, and any biconnected undirected graph
that does not contain a cycle with 3 edges are examples
of graph topologies for which the privacy of every agent is
preserved with respect to any internal malicious agent (see [25]
for the formal definition of these graph topologies). This is
because for every malicious agent i in the network, every
j ∈ N iout has a neighbor k ∈ N jout such that k 6∈ N iout (recall
Theorem 4.3). Some examples of these privacy preserving
topologies is shown in Fig. 4. 
Next, we show that even though agent 1 cannot obtain the
initial condition of the individual agents in V1k,2 6= {} and
V1k,3, k ∈ {1, · · · n¯1}, it can obtain the average of the initial
conditions of those agents. Without loss of generality, we
demonstrate our results for k = 1.
Proposition 4.1 (Island anonymity): Consider the dynamic
consensus algorithm (3) over a strongly connected and weight-
1
2
3
4
5
6
(a) A cyclic bipartite undirected
connected graph.
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
(b) A 4-regular ring lattice
undirected connected graph
on 9 vertices.
1
23
4
56
7
89
(c) A triangular stacked prism
graph.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
(d) A lattice graph with 16 ver-
tices (a biconnected graph that
contains no cycle with 3 edges).
Fig. 4: Examples of privacy preserving graph topologies.
balanced digraph G in which V11,2 6= {}. Let n2,3 = |V11,2 ∪
V11,3| and d1,1out =
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,4)
a1j be the out-degree of agent 1 in
subgraph G11 . Then, the malicious agent 1 with the knowledge
set (7) can employ the observer
ζ˙i =
∑N
j=1
aij(y
i − yj), ζi(0) = −βi, i ∈ V11,4,
η˙ = −
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,4)
a1j(y
1 − yj), η(0) = −
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
βi,
µ(t) =
η(t)−∑
i∈V1
1,4
ζi
n2,3
+ x1(t).
to have limt→∞ µ(t) = 1n2,3
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)
r
j .
Proof 4: Consider the aggregate dynamics of η and xi, i ∈
{2, 3, 4}, which reads as

η˙
x˙2
x˙3
x˙4

 =−


d
1,1
out −A12 0 −A14
−A21 Dout22 −A23 −A24
−A31 −A32 Dout33 0
−A41 −A42 0 Dout44


︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
1
1


y1
y2
y3
y4

+


0
f2 +D
out
22 g2
f3 +D
out
33 g3
f4 +D
out
44 g4

 .
Notice that L
1
1 is the Laplacian matrix of graph G11 . By Virtue
of Lemma 7.3 in the appendix we know that G11 is a strongly
connected and weight-balanced digraph. Consequently, left
multiplying both sides of equation above with 1⊤|V1
1
| gives
η˙+
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
xi =
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
(f j(t) + djout g
j(t)).
Thereby, given η(0) = − ∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
βi and xi(0) = ri, we obtain
η(t) =
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
r
j −
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
xj(t) +
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
∫ t
0
(f j(τ) + djout g
j(τ))dτ
−
∑
j∈V1
1
\{1}
βi.
On the other hand, following the proof of Theorem 4.1, we
can conclude that∑
i∈V1
1,4
ζi(t) =
∑
i∈V1
1,4
r
i −
∑
i∈V1
1,4
xi(t) +
∑
i∈V1
1,4
∫ t
0
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ
−
∑
i∈V1
1,4
βi.
Therefore, we can write
n2,3 µ(t) =
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)
r
i −
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)
xi(t) −
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)
βi
+
∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)
∫ t
0
(f j(τ) + djout g
j(τ))dτ + n2,3 x
1(t).
The proof then follows from the necessary condition (5) on
the perturbation signals, and the fact that limt→∞ n2,3 x1(t)−∑
j∈(V1
1,2∪V11,3)x
i(t) = 0 (recall that limt→∞ xi(t) =
limt→∞ xj(t), ∀i, j ∈ V).
B. Case 2 knowledge set
The first result below shows that if βi corresponding to the
locally chosen admissible perturbation signals of an agent i ∈
V is not known to the malicious agent, the privacy of the
agent i is preserved even if the malicious agent knows all
the transmitted input and output signals of agent i and the
parameter α. The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2 (Privacy preservation for i ∈ V via a concealed
βi): Consider the modified static average consensus algo-
rithm (3) with a set of locally chosen admissible perturbation
signals {f j, gj}Nj=1 over a strongly connected and weight-
balanced digraph G. Let the knowledge set of the malicious
agent 1 include the form of conditions (5) and (6), and also
the parameter α that the agents agreed to use. Let agent 1 be
the in-neighbor of agent i ∈ V and all the out-neighbors of
agent i, i.e., agent 1 knows {yj(t)}j∈N i
out+i
, t ∈ R≥0. Then,
the malicious agent 1 can obtain ri of agent i if and only if it
knows βi.
A similar statement to that of Lemma 4.2 can be made about
an external malicious agent. In case of the external malicious
agent, it is very likely that the malicious agent does not know
α, as well. Building on the result of Lemma 4.2, we make our
final formal privacy preservation statement as follows.
Theorem 4.4 (Privacy preservation using the modified av-
erage consensus algorithm (3) when the knowledge set of
the malicious agents is given by Case 2 in Definition 2):
1r1
2
r
2
3
r
3
4
r
4
5
r
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
G11G12
Fig. 5: A strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph G.
Consider the modified static average consensus algorithm (3)
with a set of locally chosen admissible perturbation signals
{f j, gj}Nj=1 over a strongly connected and weight-balanced
digraph G. Let the knowledge set of the internal malicious
agent 1 and the external malicious agent ext be given by Case
2 in Definition 2. Then, the malicious agent 1 (resp. agent
ext) cannot reconstruct the reference value ri of any agent
i ∈ V\{1} (resp. i ∈ V).
Proof 5: Any agent i ∈ V\{1} satisfies either N iout+i ⊂ N 1out+1
or N iout+i 6⊂ N 1out+1. Since the malicious agent 1 does not
know {βi}Nj=2, if N iout+i ⊂ N 1out+1, i ∈ V\{1}, (agent 1
has access to all the transmitted input and output signals of
agent i), it follows from Lemma 4.2 that it cannot reconstruct
r
i. Consequently, if N iout+i 6⊂ N 1out+1, i ∈ V\{1}, since the
malicious agent 1 lacks more information (it does not have
access to some or all of the transmitted input and output signals
of agent i), we conclude that the malicious agent 1 cannot
reconstruct ri. The proof of the statement for the external
malicious agent is similar to that of the internal malicious
agent 1, and is omitted for brevity (note here that the malicious
external agent ext lacks the knowledge of α, as well).
Remark 4.2 (Guaranteed privacy preservation when an ulti-
mately secure authority assigns the admissible perturbation
signals): If there exists an ultimately secure and trusted au-
thority that assigns the agents’ admissible private perturbation
signals in a way that they collectively satisfy (4), the privacy
of the agents is not trivially guaranteed. This is because, it is
rational to assume that the malicious agents know the neces-
sary condition (4) and may be able to exploit it to their benefit.
However, in light of Theorem 4.4, we are now confident to
offer the privacy preservation guarantee for such a case. This is
because, in this case the malicious agents’ knowledge set lacks
more information than Case 2 in Definition 2 (note that the
locally chosen admissible perturbation signals are a specially
structured subset of all the possible classes of the admissible
perturbation signals).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We demonstrate our results using an execution of the modi-
fied static average consensus algorithm (3) over the strongly
connected and weight-balanced digraph in Fig. 5 where the
parameters specifying the admissible signals are set at α = 0
and βi = 0, i ∈ V and are known to the malicious agents.
The local reference value of the agents as well the admissible
perturbations they each use are given by
r
1=3, r2=2, r3=5, r4=−3, r5=−1,
f i(t) = diout
√
(2 i)π
4i
e−t, gi(t) = sin(i t2), i ∈ V . (21)
The malicious agent here is agent 1. In regards to agents 4 and
5, despite use of non-vanishing perturbation signals g4 and g5,
as guaranteed in Theorem 4.2, agent 1 can employ observers
of the form (10) to obtain x4(0) = r4 = −3 and x5(0) = r5 =
−1 (see Fig. 6(c)). Agent 1 however, cannot uniquely identify
r
2 and r3, since N 2out = {3} 6⊆ N 1out+1 = {1, 2, 4, 5}. To show
this, consider an alternative implementation of algorithm (3)
with initial conditions and admissible perturbation signals
x1
′
(0)=3, x2
′
(0)=1, x3
′
(0)=6, x4
′
(0)=−3, x5′(0)=−1,
f i
′
(t)=f i(t), gi
′
(t)=gi(t), i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5},
f2
′
(t)=f2(t)− e−t, g2′(t)=g2(t) + e−t, (22)
where 15
∑5
i=1 x
i′(0) = 15
∑5
i=1 x
i(0) = 15
∑8
i=1 r
i = 1.2.
As Fig. 6(a) shows the execution of algorithm (3) using the
initial conditions and perturbation signals (21) (the actual
case) and those in (22) (an alternative case) converge to the
same final value of 1.2. Let δyi = yi − yi′, i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
be the error between the output of the agents in the actual
and the alternative cases. As Fig. 6(b) shows δyi ≡ 0 for
all i ∈ N 1out = {2, 4, 5}. This means that agent 1 cannot
distinguish between the actual and the alternative cases and
therefore, fails to identify uniquely the initial values of agent 2
and also agent 3. Figure 6(d) shows that an external malicious
agent that has access to the output signals of agents 2 and 3
can employ an observer of the form (12) to identify the initial
value of agent 2, i.e., r2 = 2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of preserving the
privacy of the reference value of the agents in an average
consensus algorithm using additive perturbation signals. We
started our study by characterizing the set of the necessary and
sufficient conditions on the admissible perturbation signals,
which do not perturb the final convergence point of the
algorithm.
We assessed the privacy preservation property of the average
consensus algorithm with the additive perturbation signals
against internal and external malicious agents, depending on
how much knowledge the malicious agents have about the
necessary conditions that specify the class of the signals agents
choose their local admissible perturbation signals from. We
showed that if the necessary conditions are fully known to
the malicious agents, then a malicious internal or external
agent that have access to all the transmitted input and out
signals of an agent can employ an asymptotic observer to
obtain the reference value of that agent. Next, we showed
that indeed having access to all the transmitted input and
out signals of an agent at all t ∈ R≥0 is the necessary and
sufficient condition for a malicious agent to identify the initial
value of that particular agent. On the other hand, we showed
0 5 10 15
t
-2
0
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Actual
Alternative
(a) Trajectories of the state of the
agents under the actual initial condi-
tions and the perturbation signals (21)
as well as the alternative ones in (22).
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(b) Time history of the difference be-
tween the output signal of an agent in
actual implementation scenario and its
output signal in the alternative imple-
mentation described in (22).
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(c) Time history of the observers of
the form (10) that agent 1 with knowl-
edge set (7) uses to obtain r4 and r5.
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(d) Time history of the observer (12)
of an external malicious agent with
knowledge set (7) that wants to obtain
r
2 and has direct access to y2 and y3
for all t ∈ R≥0.
Fig. 6: Simulation results when agents implement the modified
average consensus algorithm (3) over the network in Fig. 5
that if the necessary conditions defining the locally chosen
admissible perturbation signals are not fully known to the
malicious agents, then the malicious agents cannot reconstruct
the reference value of any other agent in the network.
Our problem of interest, identifying the initial condition of
the agents in the presence of unknown additive perturbation
signals, appears to be related to the concept of strong ob-
servability/detectability [26], [27] in control theory. However,
our work is different from these classical results because a
malicious agent has extra information given in the form of the
necessary conditions on the unknown admissible perturbation
signals, which it can exploit to reconstruct the initial condition
of the other agents. Our future work includes extending
our results to other multi-agent distributed algorithms such
as dynamic average consensus and distributed optimization
algorithms.
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VII. APPENDIX
To provide proofs for our lemmas and theorems we rely on a
set of auxiliary results, which we state first.
Lemma 7.1 (Auxiliary result 1): Let L be the Laplacian
matrix of a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph.
Recall L+ = R⊤LR from (1). Let g(t) = [g1(t), ..., gn(t)]⊤ ∈
L∞n . Then,
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤
Lg(τ)dτ = 0, (23)
is guaranteed to hold if and only if
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)gi(τ) dτ = α ∈ R, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (24)
Proof 6: Let
ζ˙ = −L+ζ + R⊤Lg(t), ζ(0) ∈ RN−1, (25)
η˙ = −η + R⊤Lg(t), η(0) ∈ RN−1. (26)
The trajectories t 7→ ζ and t 7→ η of these two dynamics for
t ∈ R≥0 are given by
ζ(t) = e−L
+tζ(0) +
∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤
Lg(τ)dτ, (27)
η(t) = e−tη(0) + R⊤L
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ) g(τ)dτ. (28)
Let e = ζ−η. Then, the error dynamics between (25) and (26)
is given by
e˙ = −e+ (I− L+)ζ. (29)
or equivalently
e˙ = −L+e+ (L+ + I)η. (30)
Let (23) hold. Since −L+ is a Hurwitz matrix, we have
limt→∞ ζ(t) = 0. Moreover, since g is essentially bounded,
the trajectories of ζ are guaranteed to be bounded. Therefore,
considering error dynamics (29), by invoking the ISS stability
results [19], we have the guarantees that limt→∞ e(t) = 0,
and consequently limt→∞ η(t) = 0. As such, from (28) we
obtain
R
⊤
L lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g(τ)dτ = 0. (31)
The nullspace of R⊤L ∈ R(N−1)×N is spanned by 1N ,
therefore,
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g(τ)dτ = α1N , α ∈ R,
which validates (24). Now let (24) hold. Then, using (28),
we obtain limt→∞ η(t) = 0. Since g is essentially bounded,
the trajectories of ζ are guaranteed to be bounded. Thereby,
considering error dynamics (30), by invoking the ISS stability
results [19], we have the guarantees that limt→∞ e(t) = 0,
and consequently limt→∞ η(t) = 0. Since −L+ is a Hurwitz
matrix, we obtain (23) from (27).
Lemma 7.2 (Auxiliary result 2): Let u : R≥0 → Rn be
an essentially bounded signal and E ∈ Rn×n be a Hurwitz
matrix.
(a) If limt→∞ u(t) = u¯ ∈ Rn, and E ∈ Rn×n, then
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
eE (t−τ)u(τ)dτ = −E−1 u¯. (32)
(b) If limt→∞
∫ t
0
u(τ)dτ = u¯ ∈ Rn, then
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
eE (t−τ)u(τ)dτ = 0. (33)
Proof 7: To prove statement (a) we proceed as follows. Let
µ(t) = u(t) − u¯. Next, consider ζ˙ = E ζ + µ, ζ(0) ∈ Rn,
which gives ζ(t) = eE tζ(0) +
∫ t
0 e
E(t−τ)µ(τ)dτ , t ≥ 0.
Since E is Hurwitz and µ is an essentially bounded and
vanishing signal, by virtue of the ISS results for linear
systems [19] we have limt→∞ ζ(t) = 0. Consequently,
limt→∞
∫ t
0
eE (t−τ)µ(τ)dτ = 0, which guarantees (32).
To prove statement (b) we proceed as follows. Consider
ζ˙ = u, η˙ = Eη + u, ζ(0) = 0, η(0) ∈ Rn,
which result in ζ(t) =
∫ t
0 u(τ)dτ and
η(t) = eE tη(0) +
∫ t
0
eE (t−τ)u(τ)dτ. (34)
Given the conditions on u both ζ and η are essentially
bounded signals (recall that E is Hurwitz). Let e = η − ζ.
Therefore, we can write
e˙ = Ee+E ζ, e(0) = η(0) ∈ Rn.
Since ζ is essentially bounded and satisfies limt→∞ Eζ(t) =
Eu¯, with an argument similar to that of the proof of statement
(a), we can conclude that limt→∞ e(t) = −u¯. As a result
limt→∞ η(t) = 0. Consequently, from (34), we obtain (33).
Lemma 7.3 (Auxiliary result 3): Let G be a strongly con-
nected and weight-balanced digraph. Then, every island of
any agent i, is strongly connected and weight-balanced.
Proof 8: Without loss of generality, we prove our argument by
showing that the island G11 of agent 1 is strongly connected
and weight-balanced. By construction, we know that there is
a directed path from every agent to every other agent in G11 ,
therefore, G11 is strongly connected. Next we show that G11
is weight-balanced. Let V2 = V11\{1} and V3 = V\V2.Let
the nodes of G be labeled in accordance to (1,V2,V3),
respectively, and partition the graph Laplacian L accordingly
as
L =

 d1out −A12 −A13−A21 L22 0
−A31 0 L33

 .
Since G is strongly connected and weight-balanced, we have
L1N = 0 and 1
⊤
NL = 0, which guarantee that
1⊤|V1
1
|
[−A12
L22
]
= 0,
[−A21 L22] 1|V1
1
| = 0. (35)
Therefore,
1⊤|V1
1
|
[−A12
L22
]
1|V1
1
| = 0, 1
⊤
|V1
1
|
[−A21 L22]1|V1
1
| = 0,
which we can use to conclude that sum(A⊤12) = sum(A21).
Let the Laplacian matrix of G11 be L11. Partitioning this matrix
according to order node set (1,V2), we obtain
L
1
1 =
[
d
1,1
out −A12
−A21 L22
]
,
where d
1,1
out =
∑
j∈V2 a1j = sum(A
⊤
12). To establish G11 is
weight-balanced digraph, we show next that 1⊤|V1
1
|L
1
1 = 0.
From 1⊤NL = 0, it follows that 1
⊤
|V1
1
|
[−A12
L22
]
= 0. There-
fore, to prove G11 is weight-balanced, we need to show that
d
1,1
out + sum(−A21) = 0, which follows immediately from
d
1,1
out = sum(A
⊤
12) and sum(A
⊤
12) = sum(A21).
Next we present the proof of our main results.
Proof 9 (Proof of Theorem 3.1): To prove necessity, we
proceed as follows. We write the algorithm (3) in compact
form
x˙ = −Lx− Lg+ f +Dout g = −Lx+ f +Ag. (36)
Left multiplying both sides of (36) by 1⊤N gives∑N
j=1
x˙j(t) =
∑N
j=1
(f i(t) + diout g
i(t)),
which results in∑N
j=1
xj(t)=
∑N
j=1
xj(0)+
∫ t
0
∑N
j=1
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ)) dτ.
Because xi(0) = ri, to ensure limt→∞ xi(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 r
j ,
i ∈ V , we necessarily need (4b).
Next, we apply the change of variable
p =
[
p1
p2:N
]
= Tx, (37)
where T is defined in (1), to write (36) in the equivalent form
p˙1=
1√
N
∑N
i=1
(f i + diout g
i), (38a)
p˙2:N =−L+ p2:N+ R⊤(f +Ag). (38b)
The solution of (38) is
p1(t) =
1√
N
∑N
i=1
xi(0)+ (39a)
1√
N
∫ t
0
∑N
i=1
(f i(τ) + diout g
i(τ))dτ,
p2:N (t) = e
−L+ t p2:N (0)+∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤(f (τ) +Ag(τ)) dτ. (39b)
Given (4a), (39a) results in limt→∞ p1(t) = 1√
N
∑N
i=1x
i(0) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 r
j . Consequently, given (37), to ensure
limt→∞ xi(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 r
j , i ∈ V , we need
lim
t→∞p2:N(t) = 0. (40)
Because for a strongly connected and weight-balanced di-
graph, −L+ is a Hurwitz matrix, limt→∞ e−L+ tp2:N (0) = 0.
Then, the necessary condition for (40) is (4b).
The sufficiency proof follows from noting that under (4), the
trajectories of (39) satisfy limt→∞ p1(t) = 1√
N
∑N
i=1x
i(0)
and limt→∞ p2:N (t) = 0. Then, given (37) and xi(0) = ri
we obtain limt→∞ xi(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1r
j , i ∈ V .
Proof 10 (Proof of Theorem 3.2): Given (5), it is straight-
forward to see that (6a) is necessary and sufficient
for (4a). Next, we observe that using (5), we can write
limt→∞
∫ t
0R
⊤ (f(τ)+Dout g(τ))dτ = R⊤
[
β1 · · · βN ]⊤.
Then, it follows from the statement (b) of Lemma 7.2 that
limt→∞
∫ t
0e
−L+(t−τ)
R
⊤ (f (τ) + Dout g(τ))dτ = 0. As a
result, given f +Ag = f +Dout g− Lg, we obtain
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤(f (τ) + Ag(τ)) dτ =
− lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−L
+(t−τ)
R
⊤
Lg(τ)dτ. (41)
Given (41), by virtue of Lemma 7.1, (4b) holds if and only
if (6b) holds.
Proof 11 (Proof of Lemma 3.1): When condition (a) holds,
the proof of the statement follows from statement (a) of
Lemma 7.2. When condition (b) is satisfied, the proof
follows from the statements (a) and (b) of Lemma 7.2
which, respectively, give limt→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g1(τ)dτ = α and
limt→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(t−τ)g2(τ)dτ = 0. When condition (c) is satis-
fied, the proof follows from the statement (a) of Lemma 7.2
which gives limt→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g1(τ)dτ = α and noting
that
∫ t
0 e
−(t−τ)g2(τ)dτ is the zero state response of system
ζ˙ = −ζ + g2. Since g2(t) is essentially bounded, this system
is ISS, and as a result it is also integral ISS [19]. Then,∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)g2(τ)dτ = 0, follows from [19, Lemma 3.1].
Proof 12 (Proof of Lemma 4.1): Let the error variables of the
two execution of (3) described in the statement be δxi(t) =
xi
′
(t)−xi(t), δyi(t) = yi′(t)− yi(t), δgi(t) = gi′(t)− gi(t),
and δf i(t) = f i
′
(t)− f i(t), i ∈ V . Consequently,
δx1(0) = 0, δx4 = 0, δx5(0) = 0, (42a)
δxi(0) ∈ R, i ∈ (V11,2 ∪ V11,3), (42b)
δx2(0) = −A23L−133 δx3(0), (42c)
and
δg1(t) ≡ 0, δf1(t) ≡ 0, (43a)
δgl(t) ≡ 0, δf l(t) ≡ 0, l ∈ {3, 4, 5}, (43b)
δg2(t)=−e−D
out
22 tδx2(0), δf2(t)=−A23e−L33tδx3(0).
(43c)
Given the inter-agent interactions across the network based on
agent grouping in accordance to the definition of the island
G11 (see Fig. 3), the error dynamics pertained to the modified
static average consensus algorithm (3) reads as

δx˙1
δx˙2
δx˙3
δx˙4
δx˙5

=−


d
1
out −A12 0 −A14 −A15
−A21 L22 −A23 −A24 0
−A31 −A32 L33 −A34 0
−A41 −A42 0 L44 0
−A51 0 0 0 L55


︸ ︷︷ ︸
L


δx1
δx2
δx3
δx4
δx5


+


0 A12 0 A14 A15
A21 A22 A23 A24 0
A31 A32 A33 A34 0
A41 A42 0 A44 0
A51 0 0 0 A55


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


δg1
δg2
δg3
δg4
δg5

+


δf1
δf2
δf3
δf4
δf5

. (44)
Since for a strongly connected and weight-balanced digraph
we have rank(L) = N − 1 and −(L+L⊤) ≤ 0, the sub-block
matrices −L33 and −L44 and −L55 satisfy −(Lii + L⊤ii) <
0, i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. Thereby, they are invertible and Hurwitz
matrices.
To establish (18), we show 1⊤Nδx(0) = 0N . For this, note that
taking into account (42), we can write
δx(0) =


0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −A23 0 0
0 0 L33 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
B


0
L
−1
33 δx3(0)
L
−1
33 δx3(0)
0
0

 (45)
Comparing B with the block partitioned L in (44), it is evident
that 1⊤B = 0 follows from 1⊤L = 0. Consequently, we
can deduce from (45) that 1⊤δx(0) = 0. Next, given (18),
we validate (19) by invoking Theorem 3.2 and showing that
the perturbation signals (f i
′
, gi
′
), i ∈ V , satisfy the sufficient
conditions in (6). For i ∈ V\V11,2, the sufficient conditions
in (6) are trivially satisfied. To show (6a) for i ∈ V11,2, we
proceed as follows. First note that since (f i, gi), i ∈ V11,2, are
admissible signals, they necessarily satisfy (6a). Next, note that
using (16) we can write∫ t
0
(− A23e−L33τ δx3(0) +Dout22 e−Dout22 τδx2(0))dτ =
A23L
−1
33 e
−L33tδx3(0)− e−Dout22 τ δx2(0).
Let B2 = [{βi}i∈V1
1,2
]. Then, in light of the aforementioned
observations and the fact that −L33 and −Dout22 are Hurwitz
matrices we can write
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
f ′2(τ) +D
out
22 g
′
2(τ)
)
dτ =
B2 + lim
t→∞
(
A23L
−1
33 e
−L33tδx3(0)− e−Dout22 τ δx2(0)
)
= B2,
which shows (f i
′
, gi
′
), i ∈ V11,2 also satisfy the sufficient
condition (6a). Establishing that gi
′
, i ∈ V11,2, satisfies the
sufficient condition (6b) follows from admissibility of gi,
i ∈ V11,2, which ensures it satisfies (6b), and direct calculations
as show below,
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)gi
′
(τ) dτ=
α+ lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)e−d
i
outτδxi(0) dτ=α.
Here we used the fact that for a strongly connected digraph
we have diout ≥ 1.
To establish (20) we proceed as follows. We assume that (20)
or equivalently
δy1(t) = δx1(t) + δg1(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ R≥0, (46a)
δy2(t) = δx2(t) + δg2(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ R≥0, (46b)
δy4(t) = δx4(t) + δg4(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ R≥0, (46c)
δy5(t) = δx5(t) + δg5(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ R≥0. (46d)
hold. Then, for the given initial conditions (42), we identify the
perturbation signals that make the error dynamics (44) render
such an output. As we show below, these perturbation signals
are exactly the same as (43). Then, the proof is established
by the fact that given a set of initial conditions and integrable
external signals, the solution of any linear ordinary differential
equation is unique. That is, if we implement the identified
inputs, the error dynamics is guaranteed to satisfy (46). If (46)
holds, then the error dynamics (44) reads as
δx˙1 = −d1outδx1 + δf1, (47a)
δx˙2 = −Dout22 δx2 + A23δx3 + A23δg3 + δf2, (47b)
δx˙3 = −L33δx3 + A33δg3 + δf3, (47c)
δx˙4 = −Dout44 δx4 + δf4, (47d)
δx˙5 = −Dout55 δx5 + δf5, (47e)
Here, we used Lii = D
out
ii − Aii, i ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}. Next, we
choose the perturbation signals according to (43). Then, for
the given initial conditions (42), we obtain from (47),
δx˙1 = −d1outδx1, ⇒ δx1(t) = 0 ⇒ δy1(t) ≡ 0, (48a)
δx˙3 = −L33 δx3, ⇒ δx3(t) = e−L33tδx3(0), (48b)
δx˙4 = −Dout44 δx4, ⇒ δx4(t) ≡ 0,⇒ δy4(t) ≡ 0, (48c)
δx˙5 = −Dout55 δx5, ⇒ δx5(t) ≡ 0,⇒ δy5(t) ≡ 0, (48d)
for t ∈ R≥0. Substituting for x3 ans δf2 in (47b), we obtain
δx˙2 = −Dout22 δx2 + A23e−L33tδx3(0)− A23e−L33tδx3(0)
= −Dout22 δx2, ⇒ δx2(t) = e−D
out
22 tδx2(0), (49)
for t ∈ R≥0. Finally using δg2 in (43c), we
δy2(t) = δx2 + δg2
= e−D
out
22 tδx2(0)− e−Dout22 tδx2(0) ≡ 0, (50)
for t ∈ R≥0.
Proof 13 (Proof of Lemma 4.2): If agent 1 knows βi, the
proof follows from Theorem 4.1. If agent 1 does not know
βi, since it knows (6a), there exists at least one other agent
k ∈ V\{1, i} whose βk is not known to agent 1. We note that at
the best case, βi+βk can be known to agent 1. Now consider
βik ∈ R\{0} and let βi′ = βi + βik and βk ′ = βk − βik,
and βl′ = βl for l ∈ V\{i, k}. Now consider an alternative
implementation of algorithm (3a)-(3b) with initial conditions
xl′(0) = xl(0) for l ∈ V\{i, k}, xi′(0) = xi(0) − βik and
xk′(0) = xk(0) + βik and perturbation signals f l′(t) =
f l(t), gl′(t) = gl(t) for l ∈ V\{i, k}, f i′(t) = f i(t) +
d βike
−(diout+d)t, gi′(t) = gi(t) + βike−(d
i
out+d)t and fk′(t) =
fk(t)−d βike−(dkout+d)t, gk′(t) = gk(t)−βike−(dkout+d)t, where
d ∈ R is chosen such that d > max{diout, dkout}. Let t 7→ xl′(t)
and t 7→ yl′(t), t ∈ R≥0, respectively, be the state and
the transmitted signal of agent l ∈ V in this alternative
case. We note that using limt→∞
∫ t
0
dβike
−(diout+d)τdτ =
dβik
diout+d
and limt→∞
∫ t
0 dβike
−(diout+d)τdτ = 1
diout+d
we can
show limt→∞
∫ t
0 (f
l′(τ) + dlout g
l′(τ)) dτ = βl
′
, and
limt→∞
∫ t
0
e−(t−τ)gl′(τ)dτ = α for l ∈ V . Therefore, since∑N
l=j β
j ′ = 0, by virtue of Theorem 3.2 we get
lim
t→∞x
l′(t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1
xl
′
(0) =
1
N
∑N
j=1
r
l, l ∈ V . (51)
Next, let δxl(t) = xl(t) − xl′(t) and δyl(t) = yl(t) − yl′(t),
l ∈ V . Then,

δx˙l(t) = −dloutδxl(t) +
N∑
j=1
aljδy
j(t), l∈V\{i, k},
δx˙l(t) = −dloutδxl(t)+
N∑
j=1
aljδy
j(t)+f l−f l′, l∈{i, k},
(52a){
δyl(t)= δxl, l∈V\{i, k},
δyl(t)= δxl + gl−gl′, l∈{i, k}. (52b)
To complete our proof, we want to show that yl(t) = yl′(t)
(or equivalently δyl(t) ≡ 0), l ∈ V , for t ∈ R≥0, thus
agent 1 cannot distinguish between the initial conditions xi(0)
and xi′(0). Since, for a given initial condition and integrable
external inputs the solution of an ordinary differential equation
is unique, we achieve this goal by showing that if δyl(t) = 0,
l ∈ V applied in the state dynamics (52a), the resulted
output (52a) satisfy δyl(t) ≡ 0, l ∈ V , t ∈ R≥0. For this,
first note that since δxl(0) = 0 for l ∈ V\{i, k}, then it
follows from (52a) with δyl(t) = 0, l ∈ V , that δxl(t) ≡ 0.
Subsequently, from (52b), we get the desired δyl(t) ≡ 0,
t ∈ R≥0 for l ∈ V\{i, k}. Next, we note that, from (52a) with
δyl(t) = 0, l ∈ V , given δxi(0) = βik and δxk(0) = −βik
we obtain
δxi(t) =βike
−dioutt − βike−dioutt + βike−(diout+d)t
=βike
−(diout+d)t
δxk(t) =− βike−dkoutt + βike−dkoutt − βike−(dkout+d)t
=− βike−(dkout+d)t
Subsequently, since gi−gi′ = −βike−(diout+d)τ and gk−gk′ =
βike
−(dkout+d)τ , from (52b), we get the desired δyl(t) ≡ 0,
t ∈ R≥0 for l ∈ {i, k}, which completes our proof.
